In this paper, we analyze price competition in a duopolistic newspaper industry, where politically di¤erentiated newspapers compete in two distinct markets: circulation and advertising.
INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, the press industry has experienced very important changes. In particular, the nature of competition among newspapers has changed dramatically and, in that context, it has been observed a continuous increase in the degree of concentration in the press industry (Rosse (1967) , Rosse (1978) , Dertouzos and Trautman (1990) , George and Waldfogel (2003) and Genesove (2004) provide empirical evidence on this tendency). This phenomenon gave rise to exciting discussions about the impact of concentration on variety and pluralism of information. In particular, 1 I gratefully acknowledge António Brandão, So…a Castro, João Correia-Siva, Jean Gabszewicz, Didier Laussel, Steve Wildman, the participants of UCL Doctoral Workshop; the attendants of a seminar at Porto and two anonymous referees for their detailed comments on an earlier version of this paper. Financial support is acknowledged from CETE and FCT (POCI 2010) it has been widely discussed whether the reduction in the number of newspapers might have a detrimental e¤ect on pluralism of ideas and economic welfare (George, 2001 ). Concentration in the newspaper industry has also attracted the interest of the academic community and both theoretical and empirical studies have contributed to a better understanding about the desirability and the determinants of concentration in the newspaper industry.
This paper provides a theoretical contribution to the literature on the determinants of concentration in the newspaper industry. More precisely, we exploit the two-sided nature of newspaper markets to analyze a demandside mechanism that creates an endogenous tendency of concentration in this industry. Therefore, this paper is closely related to the recent literature on the two-sided nature of the media markets (Anderson and Coate (2005) ; Dukes and Gal-Or (2003) and Gabszewicz et al (2001) ).
The two-sided nature of newspaper industries comes from the mutual cross network e¤ects that readers and advertisers exert over each other. On the one hand, the newspapers'"eyeballs"(i.e. the dimension and the composition of the newspapers' readership) exert a positive externality over advertisers. Everything else the same, an ad that reaches a larger readership is able to inform a larger number of readers about the products' characteristics. Consequently, the group of potential buyers is larger and so is the expected pro…t with that ad.
On the other hand, outcomes in the advertising market also in ‡uence the utility of newspapers to readers. However, the sign of these crossexternalities (exerted by advertisers on readers) is not as obvious as in the previous case. The majority of the papers addressing the issue of two-sided nature of media markets (Anderson and Coate (2005) or Dukes and Gal-Or (2003) ) assume that advertising is a nuisance for consumers and, accordingly, advertisers exert negative externalities over readers. This assumption seems to be reasonable for media such as television or radio, where ads actually require an interruption of the programme (therefore the nuisance). Nevertheless, in the case of newspapers (and in the case of the press in general), such assumption is not necessarily the most adequate one. Actually, several studies suggested that the advertising market might exert a positive in ‡uence on the utility of newspapers to readers, either because (i) readers positively value the ads per se or because (ii) editors with larger advertising revenues are able to develop higher-quality newspapers (with respect to the scope and quality of the editorial content, the speed of distribution, the technical quality, etcetera), which increases the utility of newspapers to readers, even when they do not positively value the ads per se.
Concerning the …rst aspect, i.e., readers' attitudes towards advertisements per se, the few empirical studies on this matter (namely Rosse (1978) , Kaiser (2006) and Kaiser and Wright (2005) ) suggest that, di¤erently from other media, in the case of press, 2 readers positively value advertising (or at least, they do not dislike it). Two major reasons might justify readers' positive attitudes towards advertisements. Firstly, di¤erently from media such as TV or radio, in the case of newspapers, readers can easily skip ads and pass directly to the editorial content without incurring any significant cost. Therefore, readers must be, at least, neutral to advertising 3 . Secondly, readers might value newspapers for their advertising content due to the fact that a signi…cant proportion of newspapers' ads corresponds to informative advertising (e.g. the newspapers'classi…ed ads constitute a privileged compilation of information on the availability and the characteristics of a wide range of goods/ services in numerous issues like housing, second-hand cars, employment and leisure).
In addition, even when readers do not value advertisements per se, due to the characteristics of the newspapers'business model, newspapers' performance in the advertising market might have a positive (indirect) in‡uence on the utility of newspapers to readers (e.g. via the quality of the newspaper). Indeed, it is a well known fact that newspapers'business considerably depends on advertising revenues (see Albarran and Chan-Olmsted (1998) and Picard et al (1998)) and, for this reason, those newspapers with weaker performances in the advertising market will have di¢ culties to achieve the same quality standards of the economically stronger newspapers (due to the liquidity constraints entailed by their performances in the advertising market). Therefore, everything else the same, the larger the advertising revenues of a given newspaper, the higher the utility of that newspaper to readers (e.g. considering that this newspaper will be able to attain a higher-quality standard 4 ). Furho¤ (1973) was well aware of such (indirect) e¤ect of advertising revenues on readers'utilities, arguing that: « The level of aspiration prevailing is determined by the economically stronger newspaper, which enjoys larger circulation and advertising revenues than does its competitor. It is this newspaper which determines to what standard both will aspire in respect of the scope and quality of editorial control, as well as the speed of distribution and technical quality of the product.... The second and inferior newspaper is then compelled to try to live up to these demands despite the fact that it lacks the economic capacity to do so» .
In any case, either when readers value ads per se or when newspapers' ad-revenues indirectly a¤ect readers'utilities, readers'decisions depend on 2 More precisely, in the case of German magazines (Kaiser (2006) and Kaiser and Wright (2005) ). 3 Even so, advertisers still spending signi…cant amounts of money in newspapers' advertisements, which is only rational if a su¢ cient number of readers reads the ads (even when they could skip them) and, obviously, those readers'behavior is only rational when they exhibit a positive attitude towards advertising. 4 A graphic illustration of this argument is presented in appendix.
the outcomes in the advertising market, which is equivalent to say that advertisers do exert a positive cross-network e¤ect over readers. Therefore, under these circumstances, the newspaper industry is characterized by cross network e¤ects (two-sided market) and newspapers are faced with interdependent demands both in the advertising and in the circulation markets. It turns out that such interdependences entail a demandside mechanism that creates an endogenous tendency of concentration in the newspaper industry. Gusta¤son (1978) provides a heuristic and informal explanation of this concentration mechanism:
« The larger of the two competing newspapers is favored by a process of mutual reinforcement between circulation and advertising, as a larger circulation attracts advertisements, which in turn attracts more advertising and more readers. In contrast, the smaller of two competing newspapers is caught in a vicious circle; its circulation has less appeal for advertisers, and it loses readers» .
In this paper, we develop a theoretical model, where cross-network externalities of advertisers on readers are entailed by the indirect e¤ect of advertising revenues on the utility of a newspaper to a reader. In that context, we provide a formal and static analysis of the "circulation spiral" mechanism just described, investigating the impact of these downward spirals on (i) newspapers'economic performance, as well as (ii) on the nature of competition between newspapers.
More precisely, we consider an asymmetric duopolistic industry, where the asymmetry between newspapers is due to exogenous di¤erences in their political positioning: while one of the newspapers is the voice of the majority's ideology, the other newspaper shares the minority's political background and, as a consequence, it has a small number of potential readers. Taking this asymmetry as given, we raise the following question: are there any circumstances under which the smaller newspaper is forced to leave the market as a result of the mutual reinforcement between circulation and advertising? We investigate the answer to this question in the context of a simple model, where competition between the horizontally di¤erentiated newspapers is analyzed within a sequential (two-stage) game. In the …rst stage, newspapers interact in the circulation market, strategically choosing their subscription prices. Afterwards, the two newspapers interact in the advertising market, competing on advertising rates.
To our knowledge, only two papers have formally addressed the impact of the circulation spiral mechanism on the survival of the smaller newspapers. Gabszewicz et al ( 2002) show that, when the fraction of readers that love advertising and the "ad-love"intensities are su¢ ciently high, only one of the newspapers is able to survive. Gabszewicz et al (2007) analyze the interaction between the advertising and the circulation markets in a dynamic setting. They consider an asym-metric duopolistic industry where newspapers are politically di¤erentiated and freely distributed. They show that, under certain circumstances, the circulation spiral mechanism is not su¢ cient to force the smallest newspaper to leave the market, even when all readers like advertising 5 . Unfortunately, Gabszewicz et al (2007) do not take into account the fact that newspapers can exploit multiple strategic instruments (such as subscription fees or advertising rates) in order to avoid or accelerate the circulation spiral e¤ect. In this note, we provide a natural extension of the static model in Gabszewicz et al (2007) , investigating whether their conclusions remain valid when newspapers are not freely distributed.
Our …rst main …nding is that, when newspapers compete on subscription and advertising prices in a static setting, it is still possible to point out a survival condition. Indeed, in line with Gabszewicz et al (2007) , when the intensity of the circulation spiral e¤ects is not too strong, none of the newspapers is evicted from the newspaper market. Furthermore, when the intensity of the circulation spiral e¤ects is weak, the minority's newspaper not only survives but it also attracts some readers with an opposite political background, which means that the minority's newspaper is able to (partially) o¤set his initial (exogenous) disadvantage in the circulation market. In contrast, in the presence of intermediate circulation spiral effects, the minority's newspaper is not evicted from the industry but, at equilibrium, the majority's newspaper attracts readers from the minority's ideology, aggravating the initial (exogenous) disadvantage of the minority's newspaper. In the presence of strong circulation spiral e¤ects, the circulation and advertising markets are closely related and, at equilibrium, eviction necessarily occurs. In this case, the downward spirals entailed by the interdependence between advertising and circulation are so strong that there is only room for one newspaper in the industry and, at equilibrium, consumers coordinate their choices, leading to the eviction of one of the newspapers.
Concerning the economic advantage of being the voice of the majority, we conclude that, in our static setting, the majority's newspaper actually has an economic advantage over its rival. Firstly, when the survival condition is accomplished, even in the presence of weak circulation spiral e¤ects, the larger newspaper always has an economic advantage over the smaller one. Secondly, when the survival condition is violated and only one of the newspapers survives, a priori, both newspapers could be evicted from the market, since the selection between newspapers is fully determined by readers' coordinated choices. However, considering the initial asymmetry on the ideological distribution of readers, it is reasonable to argue that readers'coordination towards the monopolist equilibrium where the minority's newspaper is evicted is more likely than readers'coordination towards the other monopolist equilibrium (where the majority's newspaper is evicted).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we describe the main ingredients of the model and in section 3, we characterize the equilibrium in the newspaper industry, conditional on the intensity of crossnetwork e¤ects arising in this industry. Then, in section 4; we stress the predictions of the model with respect to the economic advantage of being the voice of the majority. Finally, section 5 concludes.
THE MODEL

Newspapers
We consider two newspapers (newspaper 1 and 2) with distinct political positioning (e.g. "left wing" and "right wing", respectively). These newspapers produce di¤erentiated editorial content (horizontal di¤erenti-ation) and, at the same time, they constitute platforms between readers and advertisers. Accordingly, newspapers participate in two distinct (but interrelated) markets: (i) the circulation market, where newspapers sell editorial content to readers, charging them a subscription fee; and (ii) the advertising market, where newspapers sell "eyeballs" to advertisers, charging them an ad-rate.
Circulation market
The business of newspapers in the circulation market consists of selling politically di¤erentiated editorial content to readers. In particular, we consider that newspapers face a unit-mass population of readers and each reader buys one and only one newspaper (i.e. readers single-home and the circulation market is fully covered). In addition, we assume that readers have heterogeneous political backgrounds, distinguishing two separate spectrum of readers: readers type 1 (the "leftists", whose political background is in line with the one of newspaper 1) and readers type 2 (the "rightists", whose political background corresponds to the one of newspaper 2). We denote by 1 2 [0; 1] the mass of readers in spectrum 1 and by 2 2 [0; 1] the mass of readers in spectrum 2; with 1 + 2 = 1: In addition, we assume that there is a dominant ideology (say ideology 1;
Readers of a certain category (1 or 2) have similar political backgrounds but they might di¤er with respect to the importance they attribute to the news' political content. More precisely, in each spectrum of readers i (i = 1; 2), readers are assumed to be uniformly distributed along the interval [0; 1] according to their valuation of the news'political viewpoint. The readers' position in the aforementioned interval is denoted by m 2 [0; 1]; where readers with higher m values have more radical political viewpoints, in the sense that they attribute a signi…cant importance to the news'political content.
Finally, in order to analyze the validity of the arguments pointed out by Furho¤ (1973) and Gabszewicz et al (2007) with respect to the circulation spiral entailed by the inter-relations between the advertising and the circulation markets, we consider that the utility of a newspaper to a reader (regardless his political positioning) positively depends on the amount of the advertising revenues received by the newspaper ( a i ).
To sum up, a reader of type i (i = 1; 2) located at point m 2 [0; 1] obtains the utility U i (i; m) from reading newspaper i, with:
The signi…cance of the notation used in (1) is the following: (i) is a parameter that measures the bene…t from being informed (independently of the newspapers'political background) and is assumed to be su¢ ciently large to guarantee that all the readers have incentives to buy one of the newspapers (full market coverage), (ii) m measures the "intensity" of political preferences; (iii) s > 0 measures the "intensity" of preferences with respect to advertising revenues (s can also be interpreted as the degree of inter-relation between the circulation and the advertising markets or the "intensity of the circulation spiral e¤ ects"); (iv) a i are the advertising revenues received by newspaper i; and (v) p i 0 corresponds to the subscription price charged by newspaper i.
When this same reader buys newspaper j instead of newspaper i, he obtains a smaller informational bene…t since newspaper j 0 s news support an opposite political viewpoint. Such gap on the informational bene…t is increasing in readers'"intensities" of political preferences (m): Thus, the utility from reading newspaper j is simply given by:
where a j are the advertising revenues of newspaper j and p j 0 corresponds to the subscription price charged by newspaper j.
From the utility functions in (1) and (2), it follows that the reader in population j (j = 1; 2) located atm de…ned by the equality:
is indi¤erent between buying newspaper i or newspaper j: for m =m, the extra-informational bene…t of reading newspaper j is exactly o¤set by the larger advertising revenues and/ or the lower price of newspaper i: Therefore, readers in population j located at m <m do not su¢ ciently value the news' political viewpoints and, as a consequence, they prefer to buy newspaper i; which is cheaper and/or more attractive with respect to advertising. Conversely, those readers with more radical political viewpoints (i.e. m >m) prefer to buy newspaper j even when this newspaper is more expansive or less attractive with respect to advertising.
In this context, when s a i a j > (p i p j ) ; not only all readers 6 in population i buy newspaper i but also some readers from population j: More precisely, the mass of readers from population j who buys newspaper i is given by:m
Notice that, from equation (3), it follows that, when s a i a j (p i p j ) 1; or equivalently, when
newspaper j is so expansive and/ or so unattractive from the advertising point of view that all readers in population j prefer to read newspaper i (even the more extremist reader, who is located at m = 1). Therefore, under condition (4), newspaper j would be evicted. Analogously, when s a i a j (p i p j ) ; all readers in population j prefer to read newspaper j and a fraction of readers in population i will switch to newspaper j :
Again, when s
newspaper j is so cheap (and/ or so attractive with respect to advertising) that all readers in population i prefer newspaper j to newspaper i (equation (5)) no matter how distasteful it is for them to read news whose political content doesn't support their own ideology but the opposite one: Under these circumstances, the circulation demand faced by newspaper 1 is simply:
6 When s a i a j > (p i p j ) ; newspaper i is always more attractive than newspaper j for all readers in population i: As a matter of fact, this newspaper not only supports their political viewpoints but is also cheaper and/or more attractive in terms of advertising. 7 The signi…cance of the price regions in (6) is the following: in R 1 ; all readers buy newspaper i (regardless of their political positioning). In R 2 ; all readers type i and a fraction of readers type j buy newspaper i: In R 3 ; only a fraction of readers type i buy newspaper i; and, …nally in R 4 ; nobody buys newspaper i:
The demand faced by newspaper 2 is simply:
since the circulation market is always fully covered.
Advertising market
In the advertising market, newspapers sell "eyeballs" to advertisers. Our framework shares many similarities with the one proposed by Gabszewicz et al (2001) . The population of potential advertisers consists of a unit mass of …rms, who are considering the possibility of advertising their products in the press. These …rms exhibit di¤erent propensities to advertise: while some …rms are quite optimistic with respect to the advertising's e¢ cacy, others are rather pessimistic. Such heterogeneity is introduced into the model, admitting that the continuum of …rms is uniformly distributed in the interval [0; 1]; according to …rms'propensity to advertise ( ).
Furthermore, when …rms decide to advertise their products, they might either (i) buy an ad-insertion from only one of the existing newspapers ("single-homing") or (ii) buy an ad-insertion from each of the existing newspapers ("multi-homing"). In the …rst case ("single-homing"), the payo¤ from advertising in newspaper i (i = 1; 2) is given by 
where measures the "…rms' propensity to advertise", D i corresponds to the readership of newspaper i and r a i is the ad-rate charged by newspaper i:
When advertisers "multi-home", since there are no problems of "overlapping readerships" (all the readers "single-home"), we consider that the advertising payo¤ is simply the algebraic sum of the payo¤s that the advertisers would obtain if they had bought two exclusive ads in each of the newspapers,i.e.:
Finally, when …rms choose not to advertise at all, their payo¤ is equal to zero:
As shown by Gabszewicz et al (2001) , when potential advertisers are able to multi-home and advertising payo¤s are given by equations (8) to (10), the demand for advertising faced by newspaper i = 1; 2 can be expressed as follows:
2 > 0; or equivalently, the higher the readership of newspaper i; the higher the advertising demand faced by this newspaper.
Given the advertising demand in equation (11), newspapers' revenues from advertising will be given by
The game
The strategic interaction between newspapers, readers and advertisers is studied in the context of a sequential game with the following time structure: in the …rst stage, newspapers strategically post subscription prices. Then, readers observe these subscription prices and, perfectly anticipating the ad-revenues obtained by newspapers, they choose which newspaper they are willing to subscribe. In the second stage, newspapers set the advertising rates. Firms observe newspapers' advertising rates and newspapers'readerships (determined in the previous stage) and they take their advertising decisions.
EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
We de…ne an equilibrium for the above two-stage game in the following way:
De…nition 1: The quadruple of strategies ( p 1 ; p 2 ; r From de…nition 1; it follows that the equilibrium ad-rates are the ones that maximize newspapers' advertising revenues conditional on subscription prices (posted by newspapers in the …rst stage), i.e., equilibrium advertising rates correspond to the solution to the following maximization problem:
From de…nition 1; it also follows that the equilibrium subscription prices are the ones that maximize newspapers'total expected revenues (the sum of circulation revenues and advertising revenues) conditional on rival's subscription prices and agents'(consumers and newspapers) rational expectations about subsequent interactions in the advertising market. This formulation captures the fact that, when choosing the most adequate subscription pricing policy, newspapers take into account not only the direct in ‡uence of subscription fees on circulation revenues but also their indirect in ‡u-ence on advertising revenues (via newspapers'readerships). Therefore, the equilibrium subscription fees correspond to the solution of the following maximization problem:
In the following subsections, we move a step further and, using backward induction techniques, we identify the equilibrium of the game conditional on the intensity of the circulation spiral e¤ects (i.e. conditional on s). We start by analyzing the equilibrium in the advertising market (r 1 (p 1 ; p 2 ); r 2 (p 1 ; p 2 )) and, subsequently, we examine the price game in the circulation market.
Second stage: advertising market
Equilibrium advertising rates are given by the solution to the following maximization problem: yielding an equilibrium ad-rate 8 of
Newspapers' equilibrium market shares in the advertising market are equal to A i (p i ; p j ) = 1 2 , and the advertising revenues obtained by newspapers are given by
First stage: circulation market
The equilibrium in the circulation market is given by the pair of subscription prices (p 1 ; p 2 ) such that p i ; i = 1; 2 corresponds to the solution of the following maximization problem:
Considering that a i (p i ; p j ) is given by (13) , problem (14) might be re-written as:
where newspapers'readerships at equilibrium are jointly determined by (6) and (13) 9 , yielding:
and
Denoting k = s 4 , introducing (16) into (15), and solving for D 1 (p 1 ; p 2 ); one obtains the following reduced form of newspapers'circulation demands:
Furthermore, when we introduce (13) and (17)- (18) into (7), the price domains in (17) can be re-de…ned as follows:
with p 1 0 and p 2 0 and considering k < 
:
Under these circumstances, the newspapers'equilibrium in the circulation market is given by the system of equations that solves the following optimization problems:
In the following subsections, we identify the equilibrium observed in the newspaper industry under three di¤erent assumptions concerning the intensity of the circulation spiral e¤ects (measured by k = 10 : Then, we address the case of "intermediate circulation spiral e¤ ects", considering
and, we end up considering the case of "strong circulation spiral e¤ ects":
Notice that the remaining values of intensities of circulation spiral effects, namely k 2 Z;
, were not considered in our equilibrium analysis, given that they do not provide any new insights and they require technically complex calculations related with problems of equilibrium existence as well as problems of equilibrium multiplicity (entailed by the hypothesis of rational agents).
"Weak circulation spiral e¤ ects"
Consider that the circulation spiral e¤ects are such that the condition k min
is satis…ed by the parameters of the model 11 .
Proposition 1. Under condition (A1), the following pair of subscription prices
constitutes the unique equilibrium of the subscription price game.
Proof. In appendix.
Proposition 1 shows that, when circulation spiral e¤ects are weak, both newspapers survive at equilibrium and, in addition, the minority's newspaper is always cheaper than its rival (with p 1 p 2 = ( 1 2 ) =3 1 ). Moreover, the less representative the minority's ideology, the larger the gap in newspapers'prices. Concerning newspapers'readerships, it follows from Proposition 1 that equilibrium market shares (D i ; i = 1; 2) are given by:
Equations (23) show that, in the presence of weak circulation spiral effects, the minority's newspaper attracts readers from the opposite ideology. Therefore, under weak circulation spiral e¤ects, the minority's newspaper is able to use a low-price strategy in order to partially o¤set its initial (exogenous) disadvantage.
"Intermediate circulation spiral e¤ ects"
Suppose now that the circulation spiral e¤ects satisfy the condition 12 : 
Proposition 2 shows that, in the presence of intermediate circulation spiral e¤ects, both newspapers survive and, again, the minority's newspaper is always cheaper than its rival (with p 1 p 2 = ( 1 2 ) =3 2 ). However, di¤erently from before, at equilibrium, despite the higher price of the majority's newspaper (newspaper 1), it will be able to attract readers from the opposite ideology (readers type 2):
The reason for this lies on the fact that circulation spiral e¤ects under condition (A2) are stronger than before and, despite the higher price of newspaper 1; its better (expected) performance in the advertising market will make this newspaper more attractive, even for readers with the opposite political background. Therefore, under condition (A2), the initial (exogenous) disadvantage of the minority's newspaper is aggravated by newspapers'interaction.
"Strong circulation spiral e¤ ects"
Consider that the circulation spiral e¤ects are such that the condition
is satis…ed by the parameters of the model 13 .
Proposition 3. Under condition (A3), the game has two equilibria, corresponding to the two possible eviction outcomes. In those circumstances, the monopolist newspaper (newspaper i = 1; 2) charges a subscription fee equal to p i = k 1 > 0:
From Proposition 3, it follows that, under condition (A3), the newspapers'demands in the circulation and the advertising markets are so interrelated that di¤erences in readers'political views are overwhelmed by the supremacy of the network externalities entailed by the demand interdependence. Proposition 3 also shows that, in theory, both newspapers could a priori become the monopolist newspaper, since the selection between newspapers is fully determined by readers'coordinated choices. However, in practice, it is more likely to observe readers'coordination on the equilibrium where the minority's newspaper is evicted. Furthermore, the possibility of such a scenario increases with the relative weight of the majority's ideology.
Subscription prices and "circulation spiral e¤ ects"
The analysis of the equilibrium pair of prices pointed out in Propositions (1)-(3) reveals that, in the presence of circulation spiral e¤ects, the subscription prices are lower than the ones that would prevail in the absence of such e¤ects. Thus, when newspapers are faced with interdependent demands in the circulation and the advertising markets, competition in the circulation market becomes tougher.
Furthermore, it is worth to notice that readers' "subsidy" is directly proportional to k: In fact, the more intense the interdependences of newspapers' demands, the higher the strategic importance of having a large readership. For this reason, one might claim that the existence (and the intensity) of the circulation spiral e¤ects stimulates competition between newspapers in the circulation market (though relaxing newspapers'competition in the advertising market). This result constitutes the competitive counterpart of Gabszewicz et al (2005) .
THE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE OF BEING THE VOICE OF THE MAJORITY
In this section, we compare the economic performance of the two newspapers and we investigate whether the majority's newspaper has an economic advantage over its rival. Concerning this issue, our main …nding is that, most of the times, being the voice of the majority actually creates an important strategic advantage, independently of the intensity of the circulation spiral e¤ects.
In the case of weak circulation spiral e¤ ects, we have showed that the minority's newspaper attracts readers from the opposite ideology. However, the larger newspaper reaches a larger readership and, as a result, it is also more attractive to advertisers. Therefore, under condition (A1), the majority's newspaper receives higher revenues in both circulation ( p 1 > p 2 and D 1 > D 2 ) and advertising markets (given that D 1 > D 2 ) 14 . In the case of intermediate circulation spiral e¤ ects, the majority's newspaper reinforces its readership, even if it charges a higher subscription price. As before, this newspaper obtains higher revenues in both circulation and advertising markets 15 but, in the case of intermediate circulation spiral e¤ ects, the magnitude of the economic advantage of being the voice of the majority is even more remarkable.
Finally, in the presence of strong network e¤ ects, there is only room for one newspaper in the industry. In our framework, readers are (rational) forward-looking agents and, accounting for the existence of strong network e¤ ects, they will coordinate towards a monopolist outcome. In theory, both monopolist outcomes could arise at equilibrium and, thereby, it would be possible to conceive an equilibrium outcome where the larger newspaper is evicted. However, in practice, it is more likely that consumers coordinate towards the other monopolist solution, where it is the smaller newspaper to be evicted. In that sense, also in the presence of strong network e¤ects, being the voice of the majority constitutes a strategic advantage over the rival newspaper.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this paper, we analyze static price competition in a duopolistic newspaper industry, where politically di¤erentiated newspapers compete in prices in two distinct markets: circulation and advertising. On the one hand, newspapers sell politically di¤erentiated content to readers, charging them a subscription fee. On the other hand, newspapers sell "eyeballs" to advertisers, charging them an ad-rate.
The so-called "theory of the circulation spiral" (Furho¤, (1973) , Gusta¤son (1978) , Rosse (1978), Gabszewicz et al (2007) ) argues that the two-sided structure of newspaper markets creates positive cross-network externalities between readers and advertisers and, under certain circumstances, these externalities generate an endogenous demand-side mechanism that favours the larger newspaper in detriment of the smaller one, leading to the concentration phenomenon, which has been observed in recent decades.
In this note, we scrutinize the static impact of network externalities, investigating the nature of the static price equilibrium in a duopolistic newspaper industry, where one of the newspapers gives voice to the majority's ideology, enjoying an exogenous potential advantage over its rival.
Our …rst main …nding is that the existence (and extent) of circulation spiral e¤ects entails a tougher competition in subscription fees: at equilib- 1 4 More precisely, under condition (A1), the total revenues received by newspapers (at equilibrium) are respectively given by 1 =
: 1 5 More precisely, under condition (A2), the total revenues received by newspapers (at equilibrium) are respectively given by 1 =
rium, readers bene…t from a price discount equal to k: In addition, independently of the intensity of the circulation spiral e¤ects, the majority's newspaper is always more expansive than its rival (either in the circulation or the advertising markets).
Concerning the issue of survival and the economic advantage of being the voice of the majority, our …rst …nding is that, in the presence of the pure demand side mechanisms entailing the circulation spiral, there might be only room for one newspaper in the industry, namely when the interdependence between the advertising and the circulation markets is very intense. In that case, readers coordinate their choices towards a monopoly outcome and, coordination towards the eviction of the minority's newspaper seems more likely to occur.
Conversely, when the interdependence between the advertising and the circulation markets is not too strong (i.e. the survival conditions (A1) or (A2) hold), both newspapers necessarily survive at equilibrium. However, when the circulation spiral e¤ects are weak (condition (A1)), the minority's newspaper not only survives but it attracts readers from the opposite ideology, partially o¤setting its initial disadvantage. This possibility did not arise in Gabszewicz et al (2007) , where due to the absence of price competition, the minority's newspaper was constantly loosing readers to its rival.
In contrast, when the circulation spiral e¤ects are intermediate (condition (A2)), the minority's newspaper survives but it looses readers to the rival newspaper, which is more expansive but more attractive with respect to advertising.
In any case, when circulation spiral e¤ects are not too strong (i.e. the survival conditions are met), the majority's newspaper always gets an economic advantage over its rival, obtaining more pro…ts in both markets (circulation and advertising). Nevertheless, while in the case of weak network e¤ects, one expects this relative disadvantage to be diluted over time, in the case of midway circulation spiral e¤ects, this relative disadvantage tends to be aggravated with time and, accordingly, the minority's newspaper might be forced to leave the industry after some periods of interaction.
In our future research, we intend to develop a dynamic version of this model in order to formally investigate the accuracy of the previous reasonings and analyze the possibility of dynamic credible threats, accelerating or dampening the circulation spiral mechanisms. Our future research agenda on the topic also includes the analysis of more complex forms of interaction between consumers and advertisers (e.g. targeting advertising) and the analysis of newspapers location choices (namely with respect to their political positioning). [17] Rosse, J.; Dertouzos, J (1978) . "The evolution of one newspaper cities". Proceedings of the symposium on media concentration, vol. II.
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which is the highest price that guarantees the eviction of newspaper i given that p i = 0:
However, with p i = 0 and k < 1 (as it is the case under condition (A1)); p j = k 1 corresponds to a negative price and,it can never be an equilibrium as it violates the condition of non-negativity of prices. For this reason, under condition (A1), an eviction equilibrium (in price domains R 1 or R 4 ) will never be observed.
Price equilibrium in R 2
Let us assume that the equilibrium prices are such that k ( 1 2 
Analogously, the newspaper 2 0 s total revenues are equal to
and the best reply function associated with the FOC to newspaper 2 0 s optimization problem is:
In equilibrium both newspapers are in their best reply functions and the equilibrium subscription prices are the solution to system of equations formed by equations (26) and (27):
In equilibrium both newspapers are in their best reply functions and the equilibrium subscription prices are the solution to system of equations formed by equations (29) and (30):
and newspapers would obtain total revenues equal to
Notice that this equilibrium is valid as long as:
(1) Non-negativity of prices is guaranteed:
(3) Given the rival's strategy, none of the …rms have incentives to raise or lower its subscription price, inducing a switching in the price domain from R 3 to other price domain. This is always the case for newspaper 1; since 1 > 2 and, as a result, the total revenues of newspaper 1 are a concave function. Nevertheless, that is not necessarily the case for newspaper 2 and one must guarantee that, given p 1 in (31), newspaper 2 never has incentives to induce a switch in the price regime from R 3 to other domains.
(3.1) Newspaper 2 is never interested in raising his price so much that the price domain would switch from R 3 to R 1 because, in those circumstances, he would be evicted from the market, getting zero revenues); (3.2) Newspaper 2 cannot lower his price in order to evict newspaper 1;
since he would have to charge a price of
which corresponds to a negative price, violating the non-negativity condition.
A su¢ cient but non-necessary condition to guarantee that newspaper 2 doesn't have any incentives to induce a switch in the price regime from R 3 to R 2 is: ; which corresponds to condition (A1). Therefore, under condition (A1), the pair of prices pointed out in proposition 1 constitute an equilibrium of the game and, for the reasons pointed out in point 1 and 2 of this proof, such equilibrium is unique.
Proof of proposition 2:
Under condition (A2), one observes k < 1 and, consequently, for the same reasons pointed out in part 1 of the proof of proposition 1; eviction outcomes are not possible (as they would violate the condition of non-negativity of prices).
Therefore, under (A2), only those subscription prices in price regions R 2 and R 3 might be considered as candidates to equilibrium. Then, to prove proposition 3; we start by showing that any equilibrium in the price region R 3 is inconsistent with condition (A2) and we proceed with the identi…cation of the equilibrium in price region R 2 ; showing that such equilibrium is compatible with condition (A2).
Price equilibrium in R 3
In the proof of proposition 1 (part 3); it had been shown that, when (p 1 ; p 2 ) 2 R 3 ; i.e., p 1 + k 1 p 2 < p 1 + k (1 2 1 ) ; the price equilibrium candidate is given by the pair of subscription prices in (31):
In part 3 of proposition 1; it has also been shown that this candidate to equilibrium will only constitute an e¤ective equilibrium, when the "intensities of the circulation spiral e¤ ects" are such that the following three conditions are met:
price non-negativity condition (C1); domain conditions (C2) and (C3), stability conditions.
However, under condition (A2), the domain condition (C3) is always violated Consequently, under condition (A2), any pair of prices (p 1 ; p 2 ) 2 R 3 cannot constitute an equilibrium of the game (violating, at least, the price domain conditions). This leaves us with (p 1 ; p 2 ) 2 R 2 as the unique candidates to be an equilibrium of the game.
Price equilibrium in R 2
In the proof of proposition 1 (part 2); it had been shown that, when (p 1 ; p 2 ) 2 R 2 ; i.e., k (1 2 1 ) + p 1 p 2 p 1 k + 1; the price equilibrium candidate is: 
Again, this candidate to equilibrium will only constitute an e¤ective equilibrium, when the "intensities of the circulation spiral e¤ ects" are such that the following three conditions are met: price non-negativity condition (B1); domain conditions (B2), the stability conditions. ; we have 1 2k 2 < 0 and 1 2k 1 < 0 and consequently, circulation demands in price domains R 2 and R 3 are positively sloped and, as a result, the second order conditions associated with the pro…t maximization problem will be violated for (p 1 ; p 2 ) 2 fR 2 [ R 3 g : Furthermore, when k 1 2 2 ; price domains should be re-written as follows:
and it is easy to see that, there is a problem of overlapping of the distinct price regions (in particular, the duopolistic price regions (R 2 and R 3 ) are fully contained in the monopolist price regions ( R 1 and R 4 ). Therefore, the price equilibrium under (A3) will never occur for (p 1 ; p 2 ) 2 fR 2 [ R 3 g since, at an equal price, both newspapers always prefer to be monopolist rather than to share the market.
For this reason, equilibrium outcomes can only emerge in price regions R 1 or R 4 ; corresponding to the eviction outcomes. In the …rst case, the price monopolist equilibrium will be given by
and newspaper 2 is evicted from the market since it wouldn't be able to attract any readers, even when p 2 = 0:
The price equilibrium candidate in (34) corresponds to an e¤ective equilibrium, since:
Non-negativity conditions are met (in equality for p 2 ); Domain conditions are met (in equality); Stability conditions are met, since newspaper 2 cannot lower is price (i.e., he cannot avoid being evicted) and newspaper 1 is not interested in lowering his price neither (it is able to become monopolist for p 1 ): Similarly, neither newspaper 2 or newspaper 1 are interested in raising their prices: on the one hand, newspaper 2 is unable to attract readers of any population even when it is freely distributed. On the other hand, newspaper 1 is not interested in raising the price as it would entail his eviction (remind that, under condition (A3), the price domains R 2 and R 3 are overlapping with the price domain R 1 and R 4 for p 1 0 and, consequently, when newspaper 1 raises slightly his price from k 1; the circulation demand jumps immediately from R 1 to R 4 ).
A similar argument holds for the price domain R 4 ; where newspaper 1 is evicted and, under condition (A3), the alternative equilibrium in subscription prices corresponds to a corner solution where D 1 = 0; even when newspaper 1 is freely distributed (p 1 = 0) and:
